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TULSA LAW JOURNAL
NOTES AND COMMENTS
TORTS: PIED PIPER DOCTRINE-RIGHT OF RECOVERY OF
CHILDREN ATTRACTED INTO STREET BY VENDORS FOR
INJURY BY ANOTHER VEHICLE
What could be more musical and appealing to a child on a hot, sum-
mer day than the sound of bells of an approaching ice cream wagon?
What could be more refreshing than a few chips of ice from an un-
'guarded ice truck? How can any person help but recognize the strong
attraction upon children that these things exert? Realizing this attraction,
one wonders what duty, if any, vendors owe infants they have attracted. In
particular, is the vendor liable if attracted children are injured by another
vehicle? In answering this question, courts have considered several views
of negligence and have arrived at many different results. One of the first
facets raised is violation of a statute or ordinance.
VIOLATION OF STATUTE OR ORDINANCE
The standard of conduct demanded of a reasonable man may be
determined by legislative enactment.1 Legislation often demands that
citizens do or refrain from doing certain acts. The weight given to the
negligence resulting from noncompliance varies from one jurisdiction to
another.2 Some courts hold that since most of these statutes or ordinances
are penal in nature, no civil liability will arise solely from their violation.3
The opposite is true in the majority of jurisdictions and violation can give
rise to a civil cause of action.4
That an ordinance, as opposed to a statute, is violated has significance
in some jurisdictions. Some courts hold that violation of an ordinance is
less evidence of negligence than is violation of a statute.5 Several courts
hold that only when the ordinance is a codification of a common law
duty can the violation be negligence as a matter of law.0 A few jurisdic-
tions refuse to predicate defendant's liability upon violation of an ordi-
nance enacted for the protection of the city, as opposed to one for the
1 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), ToRTs 5 285(a) (1965).2 PRossER, TORTS 5 35 (3d ed. 1964).
3 Barboza v. Decas, 311 Mass. 10, 40 N.E.2d 10 (1942); Samuel D. Wasser-
man, Inc. v. KLahre, 24 N.J. Super. 143, 93 A.2d 628 (1952); Behler v. Daniels,
19 RI. 49, 31 Ad. 582 (1895).
438 AM. JUL. Negligence § 158, at 827 n.20 (1941).
5 Carlock v. Westchester Lighting Co., 268 N.Y. 345, 197 N.E. 306 (1935);
Weeks v. McNulty, 101 Tenn. 495, 48 S.W. 809 (1898).
6AM. Jui. Negligence § 168, at 842 & n.10 (1941).
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protection of the lives and property of the citizens.7 On the basis that
only the state has this power, some courts hold that violation of a mu-
nicipal ordinance cannot create civil liability against the defendant 8 How-
ever, the majority and more modern view is that there is very little differ-
ence between a statute and an ordinance as far as defendant's liability in
negligence for its violation.9
Before a defendant's violation of an ordinance or statute is considered
negligence as a matter of law, the plaintiff must show that he was within
the class of persons the law intended to protect; that the injury suffered
was one that the statute attempted to prevent; and that the violation was
proximate cause of his injury.10 In determining if the plaintiff is within
the class the statute was aimed at protecting, the court will look to the
purpose, language, and legislative history of the statute.1' Another cri-
terion is to determine the nature of the duty imposed; thus, a broad duty
towards citizens at large ordinarily will cover all persons injured by vio-
lation. 12 The plaintiff must do more than show that if the defendant had
not violated the statute, no injury would have resulted. He must show that
the injury was the particular hazard the statute attempted to prevent.13
Finally, the plaintiff must prove that defendanes violation was a proximate
cause of the injury.14 Defendant is not liable for violating a statute if the
injury would have occurred without the violation.15
In most jurisdictions once the court has determined that the statute
is applicable, it directs the jury that the unexcused violation is conclusive
on the issue of negligence.16 This is negligence per se. Some courts, how-
7 Langazo v. San Joaquin Light & Power Corp., 32 Cal. App. 2d 678, 90
P.2d 825 (1939); Platte & Denver Canal & Millings Co. v. Dowell, 17 Colo. 376,
30 Pac. 68 (1892); Jackson v. Kansas City, Ft. S & M. R.R., 157 Mo. 621, 58
S.W. 32 (1900); Frontier Steam Laundry Co. v. Connolly, 72 Neb. 767, 101 N.W.
995 (1904).
SCaughlin v. Campbell-Sell Baking Co., 39 Colo. 148, 89 Pac. 53 (1907);
Rockford City Ry. v. Blake, 173 I1. 354, 50 N.E. 1070 (1898); Flynn v. Canton
Co., 40 Md. 312, 17 Am. Rep. 603 (1873).
9 38 AM. JRi. Negligence § 168, at 842 n.17 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS § 35,
at 203 n.81 (3d ed. 1964).10PRossR, TORTS § 35 (3d ed. 1964); REsTATE mNT (SECOND), TORTS §
286 (1965).
11FGTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505 (1963).12 E.g., Buravski v. DiMeola, 141 Conn. 726, 109 A.2d 867 (1954); Hanson
v. Kemmish, 201 Iowa 1008, 208 N.W. 277 (1926); Hinson v. Dawson, 241 N.C.
714, 86 S.E.2d 585 (1955).
1'E.g., Nunneley v. Edgar Hotel, 36 Cal. 2d 493, 225 P.2d 497 (1950);
PhoenLx Amusement Co. v. White, 306 Ky. 361, 208 S.W.2d 64 (1948); Elam
v. Loyd, 201 Okla. 222, 204 P.2d 280 (1949).
14 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 166, at 837 n.16 (1941).
15E.g., Wealth v. Renai, 49 Del. 289, 114 A.2d 809 (Super. Ct. 1955); Hol-
lingshead Motors Co. v. Crogan, 336 Ill. App. 423, 84 N.E.2d 440 (1949); Paquin
v. St. Johnsbury Trucking Co., 116 Vt. 466, 80 A.2d 669 (1951).
16 38 Am. JU. Negligence § 158, at 827 & n.20 (1941); PRossER, TORTS
5 35, at 202 & n.73 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TORTS S 288B(1965).
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ever, hold that the violation raises a rebuttable presumption of negligence,
which demands a binding instruction if not countered.17 A third view
considers the violation as only evidence of negligence to be accepted or
rejected by the jury."' Some courts in the majority follow the third view
when the violation is of an ordinance or traffic law and not a statute.
In Mead v. Parker2 the court held that the ordinance against park-
ing on the wrong side of the street was for the control of vehicular traffic
and not for the protection of pedestrians. Thus, the pedestrian plaintiff
was not within the class of persons the ordinance intended to protect.
In cases of double parking in violation of statute, the plaintiff's
biggest difficulty lies in proving the violation was a proximate cause of
the injury. In McKay v. Hedger,2 the court held that the statute against
double parking was enacted to provide both pedestrians and vehicular
traffic with unobstructed use of highway. In that case a child ran from
behind a parked truck and was struck by another auto. The court agreed
with the finding of the jury that defendant's double parking was the
proximate cause of the accident.22
In Landers v. French's Ice Cream Co., 8 the defendant was parked
four feet from the curb in violation of a city ordinance forbidding the
parking of vehicles at a distance more than six inches from the curb. The
plaintiff, standing across the street from defendant's truck, was hurt when
the driver of one of two racing automobiles swerved to avoid hitting the
truck, slammed on his brakes upon seeing plaintiff, and skidded across
the street. The court held the violation of the ordinance raised a jury
question whether the manner of parking was a concurring proximate
cause of the event. In Saulibury v. Williams,24 and Vought v. Jones,5
the Virginia court held it a jury question whether parking at the side of
a road so obstructed the highway as to render use of the highway danger-
1' 38 AM. JuR. Negligence § 158, at 829 nn.1 & 2 (1941); PRossERn, TORTS
S 35, at 202 n.79 (3d ed. 1964).1838 AM. JUR. Negligence § 158, at 829 nn.3 & 4 (1941); PRossER, TORTS
5 35, at 202 n.80 (3d ed. 1964).
19Silvia v. Pennock, 253 Iowa 779, 113 N.W.2d 749 (1962); Hodgdon v.Barr, 334 Mich. 60, 53 N.W.2d 844 (1952); Smulczeski v. City Center of Music& Drama, 3 N.Y.2d 498, 146 N.E.2d 769, 169 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1957); Erdahl v.Hegg, 98 N.W.2d 217 (N.D. 1959). See, Comment, Negligence Per Sc-Traffi
Violations, 30 TENN. L. REV. 556 (1962-1963).
20340 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965).
21 139 Cal. App. 266, 34 P.2d 221 (1934).22 Acccord, Servito v. Lynch & Sons Van & Storage Co., 191 Cal. App. 2d 799,
13 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1961); Cardona v. Toczydlowski, 35 Ill. App. 2d 11, 180NB.2d 709 (1962); Naeris v. New York Tel. Co., 6 App. Div. 2d 196, 175
N.Y.S.2d 683 (1958), aff'd, 5 N.Y.2d 1009, 158 N.E.2d 126, 185 N.Y.S.2d 264(1959). Contra, Maggitti v. Cloverland Farms Dairy, 201 Md. 258, 95 A.2d 81(1953); Jarosh v. Van Meter, 171 Neb. 61, 105 N.W.2d 531 (1960).2898 Ga. App. 317, 106 S.E.2d 325 (1958).
24205 Va. 727, 139 S.E.2d 816 (1965).
25205 Va. 719, 139 S.X.2d 810 (1965).
[Vol. 3, No. 2
3
Monte: Torts: Pied Piper Doctrine--Right of Recovery of Children Attract
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1966
1966] NOTES AND COMMENTS 149
ous within the meaning of the statute. Further, the juries were correct
in finding that the negligence of the defendants were proximate causes
of the accidents, and the negligence of other motorists involved were at
most concurring causes.
It should be noted that in the above cases, where the defendants vio-
lated an applicable statute, the courts did not base liability solely upon the
violation. However, as will be shown shortly, these violations were con-
sidered important factors in finding defendants liable.
ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE
Those jurisdictions which accept this doctrine hold:
[.. IT]hat one who maintains upon his premise a condition,
instrumentality, machine, or other agency which is dangerous to
children of tender years by reason of their inability to appreciate
the peril therein, and which may reasonably be expected to
attract children of tender years to the premises, is under a duty
to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the dangers
of the attraction.26
On the theory that an owner can expect the presence of children, this
doctrine is extended in many cases to dangerous instrumentalities on the
highways2 7 One of the important conditions of liability under this doc-
trine is that the injury be caused either by the instrumentality itself or
by something with which the instrumentality has brought the infant in
contact. 8
While courts uniformly have rejected the application of this doctrine
to vendors or hucksters, their reasons have been anything but consistent.
One of the first cases to reject the doctrine was Baker-Evans Ice Cream
Co. v. Tedesco.29 Here the plaintiff and other children gathered around
the parked ice truck of the defendant while the driver was making a de-
livery. When he returned, he yelled at them and the plaintiff ran into
the road where she was hit by an automobile. Without explaining their
reasons, the court held the doctrine did not apply to the facts and cir-
cumstances. The absence of an explanation can be understood from
Ohio's dislike and almost complete rejection of the doctrine. 0 In another
ice-truck case, Ice Delivery Co. v. Thomas,3 ' the Kentucky court, in hold-
ing that an ice truck is not an attractive nuisance, pointed out that the
tendency of more recent cases is to restrict, rather than broaden, the appli-
2638 Am. JuR. Negligence S 142, at 803 (1941).
27 38 AM. Ju. Negligence § 154, at 823 & n.11 (1941).
2838 AM. JuR. Negligence § 151, at 818 n.14 (1941).
29 114 Ohio St. 170, 150 N.E. 745 (1926).
3 0 Brown v. Rechel, 108 Ohio App. 347, 161 N.E.2d 638 (1959.); Wheeling
& L E. R.R. v. Harvey, 77 Ohio St. 235, 83 N.E. 66 (1907).
312 90 Ky. 230, 160 S.W.2d 605 (1942).
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cation of the doctrine. In a third case, Coffey v. Oscar Mayer Co.,." the
Wisconsin court bottomed its refusal to treat an ice truck as an attractive
nuisance on the basis that it is not an inherently dangerous instrumentality.
It also pointed to the trend limiting the doctrine. While not mentioning
the attractive nuisance doctrine, the court in McKay' s arrived at virtually
the same result.
Although rejecting the doctrine, courts are presented with a closer
question when the defendant does affirmative acts to attract children
to his vehicle. In Sidders v. Mobile Softee, Inc.,-*4 the defendant was
charged with operating at night a brightly lighted ice cream vending
truck with bell and loud speaker and inducing the infant plaintiff to
cross the street. This, allegedly, resulted in her being injured by an auto-
mobile when she attempted to re-cross the street to her home. In af-
firming the trial courts dismissal for failure to state a cause of action
on grounds of negligence or attractive nuisance, the appellate court said:
The defendant is accused of being a sort of modern Pied Piper
and as such responsible for any and all mishaps to its young
customers. It is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons. Nor
is it charged with a violation of law. The operation of an ice
cream vending truck attractive to children is admittedly not a
nuisance.35
This view was not very surprising in light of Ohio's restricted view
of the doctrine. In reversing the trial court's finding that defendant's
track, which was selling crabs along the highway, was an attractive
nuisance, the Louisiana court in Molliere v. American Ins. Groap, a re-
lied upon Coffey and Baker-Evans. This reliance could be questioned
because the later cases concerned ice trucks and the defendants com-
mitted no affirmative acts to encourage the plaintiffs presence. Where-
as in the former case the whole method of conducting the vending encour-
aged customers to come to the truck. The court was, in no small part,
basing its decision on public policy when it said:
To so hold [defendanes truck an attractive nuisance] would bring
every peddler's truck traveling our highways within the realm
of the doctrine, and would cause the owners or operators thereof
to take unusual precautionary measures to prevent accidents to
young children who might cross the highway to come to the
truck.3 7
After examining Tennessee's law on the attractive nuisance doc-
32 252 Wis. 473, 32 N.W.2d 235 (1948).
33 McKay v. Hedger, supra note 21.
34 19 Ohio Op. 2d 446, 184 N.E.2d 115 (Ct. App. 1961).
as Id. at _ , 184 N.E.2d at 117.
36158 So. 2d 279 (La. Ct. App. 1963), 18 ARm L. REv. 178 (1964-1965).
37Id. at 283.
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trine, the Sixth Circuit in Mead38 held that it did not apply to defend-
ant's ice cream vending truck. Noting that the recent Tennessee cases
were limiting the application of the doctrine, the court quoted with ap-
proval the public policy argument of the district court. This essentially
was that to impose upon defendants the duty of warning young customers
of obvious dangers from passing vehicles would totally destroy the vend-
ing trucks usefulness 39
Both Molliere and Mead are in accord with the view taken by some
authorities.40 However, a somewhat more realistic approach was adopted
by Kentucky in Mackey v. Spradlin .4' There the court pointed out that
while these situations are not within the attractive nuisance doctrine,
they contain much of the same policy considerations that led to its
adoption. On the basis that one who creates a hazard is in a less defen-
sible position than one who maintains one, it was felt that the former
should be held more responsible. The court said:
In this particular type of situation the danger is enhanced by the
sense of haste that is purposely aroused in the children of a
neighborhood by the tinkling of bells and flashing of lights
heralding the imminent arrival of an attraction that will stay
but a moment and be gone unless they come at once. The re-
sponsibility of one who knowingly provokes into action the
natural recklessness of irresponsible children ought surely be
proportionate to the degree of danger he thereby creates.4 2
The courts are obviously correct when they hold that the attractive
nuisance doctrine does not apply in these situations. It would be differ-
ent if the ice trucks and ice cream vending trucks were inherently dan-
gerous. But there is no valid reason for the courts refusing to recognize
the attraction that these vehicles exert upon children and the hazards that
they may be subjected to by the presence of the vehicles. The public pol-
icy arguments are not acceptable when children may be injured while the
defendant profits by means of a business that creates the hazard.
Furthermore, the reason commonly asserted for rejecting the applica-
tion of the doctrine, that the owner had no reason to anticipate the pres-
ence of children, is not present when he solicits their patronage. The
approach of the court in Mackey suggests a more reasonable alternative
than the flat rejection of the doctrine and its policy.
DuTy
Assuming that liability has not been predicated upon the violation
38 Mead v. Parker, supra note 20.
39 Mead v. Parker, 221 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).
40 R STATBMBNT (SEcoND) TORTS § 339. (1965).41 379 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1965).
42 Id. at 37.
19661
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of a statute or the attractive nuisance doctrine, the plaintiff must rely
upon the principles of negligence. In order to recover the plaintiff will
first have to show that the defendant owed him a legal duty to conduct
himself (defendant) in such a manner as not to expose the plaintiff to
any unreasonable risks.43 If under the circumstances a person of ordinary
intelligence would realize that failure to exercise ordinary care in his
actions will place another in danger, a duty arises which demands that
he use care to avoid the danger."4 Since he need not foresee the particu-
lar injury, it is sufficient that the actor foresee, or in exercise of ordinary
care he would have foreseen, that some kind of injury will probably occur
to some person through failure to observe this duty.45 Because young chil-
dren lack ability to appreciate peril, the defendant must observe more
care toward them than toward adults.4 6 When a person for his own bene-
fit invites another upon his property by express or implied invitation,
the former owes the latter a duty not to injure the visitor by negligent
activities, to inspect the property for dangerous conditions, and to exer-
cise reasonable care to protect the visitor from foreseeable dangers in the
use or condition of the land.47 However, this duty does not extend to
those perils that are obvious to the visitor unless it is foreseeable that
he might still be harmed.4 8 When the invitees are children, special con-
sideration is given to their impulsiveness and attraction to certain dan-
gerous conditions.49
In the vendor-huckster situations the courts have considered the ques-
tion of duty in several different ways. In Baker-Evans ;0 the court felt the
only duty owed to the children by the defendant was to warn them away
from his ice truck before he started it.
That children might be frightened by the manner of warning and run
into the street was not considered. The court was concerned only with the
possible liability of the defendant if he injured the children by moving
the truck without giving warning. This narrow limitation of duty to in-
juries concerning the instrumentality itself was slightly broadened in
Bloom v. Good Hamor Ice Cream Co. 51 There the court implied that
43 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 12 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS § 30 (3d ed. 1964);
RESrATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 281 (1965).
44 E.g., Connecticut Sav. Bank v. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co., 138 Conn. 298,
84 A.2d 267 (1951); Dumas v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 94 N.H. 484, 56A.2d 57 (1947); Honeycutt v. Bryan, 240 N.C. 238, 81 S.E.2d 653 (1954).45 E.g., Railway Express Agency v. Brabham, 62 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1952);
Phillips v. Doyle, 167 Kan. 376, 207 P.2d 465 (1949); Schmanski v. Church
of St. Casimir of Wells, 243 Minn. 289, 67 N.W.2d 644 (1954).
46 38 AM. JUR., Negligence § 40 nn.14 & 15 (1941).
4738 AM. JUR. Negligence 5 96 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS § 61 (3d ed.
1964); RESTATmAENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 343 (1965).
4838 AM. JUsR. Negligence S 97 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS § 61 (3d ed. 1964);
RESTATEmENT (SECOND), TORTS 5 343A (1965).
49 38 AM. JUR. Negligence 5 137 nn.18 & 19 (1941).50 Baker Evans Ice Cream Co. v. Tedesco, supra note 29.
I' 179 Md. 384, 18 A.2d 592 (1941).
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the duty of the defendant to the child only applies when the child is
approaching or near the truck. The court in Mollier5 2, relying upon the
Baker-Evans and Coffey 53 cases, felt that the defendant owed his custom-
ers a duty of ordinary care while around his crab-vending truck. The
majority undoubtedly was influenced by lack of evidence that the defend-
ant was aware of the presence of the infant plaintiff. The dissent dis-
counted this fact and felt that defendant's knowledge of the propsensities
of crabs to attempt to escape when handled in a careless manner de-
manded that he take extra precautions. The negligence occurred, accord-
ing to the dissent, through defendant's careless handling which allowed
a crab to drop on the plaintiff's feet, resulting in the frightened child
dashing into the road. The dissent further stated:
In my opinion the agent of the vendor of the crabs-having in-
vited prospective purchasers to a dangerous position, a main
highway-was under an obligation to forsee the possibility of
just such an accident as occurred here.5 4
In Mead5 5 the court held that the defendant did not owe the plaintiff
any duty in relation to other vehicles on the grounds that such peril was
obvious, and to impose a duty would destroy the usefulness of the ice
cream vending truck.
As would be expected, those cases finding defendant vendor or huck-
ster liable look at the defendant's duty to the plaintiff in a different light
than the above cases. It was held in McKay " that the defendant should
not have left the rear doors to the ice truck open and the ice exposed to
view. This duty was raised because the court felt that a reasonably
prudent person would foresee that children would be attracted to the
truck for pieces of ice, would continue to play around it, and some of
them might run into the road and be hit by a motorist whose view was
obstructed by the truck. Thus, the defendant was held to have foreseen
the exact accident that occurred. In Vought r7 the court said:
Under elementary principles it was the duty of the defendant
operator of the truck to exercise ordinary care to provide a rea-
sonably safe place for this child [plaintff]who was his business
invitee. To that end, he was required to exercise ordinary care
to select a position on the road where he could stop his vehicle
and dispense his merchandise to the plaintiff without exposing
him to danger.58
The jury would have to consider whether defendant exercised ordinary
care in inducing plaintiff to cross a road on which vehicles traveled at
35 miles per hour. Or whether the defendant should have turned his
5 2 Molliere v. American Ins. Group, sqpra note 36.
5 3 Coffey v. Oscar Mayer Co., supra note 32.
5 4 Molliere v. American Ins. Group, sepra note 36, at 285 (dissent).55 Mead v. Parker, supra note 20.56 McKay v. Hedger, supra note 21.5 7 Vought v. Jones, supra note 25.
68Id. at ., 139 S.E.2d at 815.
19663
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vehicle around and parked on plaintiff's side of road to fulfill this duty
to the plaintiff business invitee. The court in Mackey 9 was applying the
policy of the attractive nuisance doctrine when it demanded that defend-
ant's responsibility be proportionate to the danger he creates when he
incites the natural recklessness of irresponsible children. Having inten-
tionaUy attracted children to where they are in danger of being hit by
passing traffic, the defendant had a duty to watch for such traffic and
either to warn the children whenever any vehicle came close enough to
create a hazard or to use whatever other reasonable efforts necessary to
prevent injury.
The view taken by the court in Baker-Evans is too restrictive in that
it recognizes only duty owed to the children gathered around the ice
truck. Granted that the driver should warn the children to stand clear
before he moves the truck, it seems reasonable that because of passing
traffic he should have a duty to be careful in his manner of warning to
prevent frightening the children into running into the road. Likewise,
the court's view in Bloom, that the defendant owes a duty only when
the children are approaching and around the truck is too restrictive. It
would require only slightly more effort on the part of the vendor to
extend this duty to the child while he is leaving the truck and re-crossing
the street. The reasoning of the courts in Vought and Mackey are more
consistent with this approach in light of the fact that the children are
business invitees whose presence in a dangerous area has been solicited
by the defendants. It is hard to see how such an extension of the defend-
anis" duty would destroy the usefulness of the vending trucks as the Mead
case argues. While the latter case says that the perils of passing vehicles
are obvious to children, it can be argued that a vendor, knowing the irre-
sponsibleness and recklessness of excited children, should not be allowed
to rely on their cognizance of the hazards in observing his duty of care.
CAUSATION
Once having established that the defendant owes 'the plaintiff a duty,
it is vital to the plaintiff's action for negligence thit he show a reasonable
con&tion between his injuries and the defendant's acts or omissions.60
Since every act or omission by a person has an effect on someone else,
it would seem that the actor would always be liable. For example, if the
defendant frightened the plaintiff, and while running down the street
to escape, she is hit on the head by a brick that is jarred loose from a
building hit by a crashing airplane, he has, in a sense, caused her injury.
If he had not frightened her, she would not have run down the street and
would not have arrived at the particular spot of her injury in time to
59 Mackey v.'Spradlin, supra note 41.
60 E.g., Brewer v. Johnson, 247 Iowa 483, 72 N.W.2d 556 (1955); Estes v.
Gibson, 257 S.W.2d 604 (Ky. 1953); Sunray Oil Corp v. Burge, 269 P.2d 782
(Okla. 1954).
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be hit by the brick. To find liability in such a situation would impose
absolute liability for all wrongful acts. Thus the law as a matter of policy
limits liability to those causes that are closely related to the plaintiff's
injuries.01
In attempting to limit the liability of the defendant, many jurisdic-
tions have adopted the "but for" or "sine qa non" rule. 2 This rule is
that the defendant's acts will not be considered the cause of the plaintiff's
injuries if the injuries would have occurred without the defendant having
acted. It is apparent from this rule that it operates only to exclude the
defendant from liability. As will be discussed in the following sections,
merely because the plaintiff shows that he would not have been injured
if the defendant had not acted, the liability will not necessarily be estab-
lished. Another test that has found wide acceptance is the "substantial
factor" test.63 The defendant will be held responsible for an event if
his actions were a substantial factor in bringing about the event. The
necessity of this broader test is apparent when there are two, independent,
concurring causes of the plaintiff's harm. For example, if A shoots X
in the head and B shoots him in the heart, under the "substantial factor"
test both are liable since each defendant played a material part in killing
X. However, under the "but for" test, neither would be liable since, as
for as each defendent is concerned, the plaintiff would have died in any
event.
Since th& existence of the causal relation is vital to the plaintiff's cause
of action, he has the burden of proof.6 4 To satisfy this burden he must
convince the jury that it is more probable than not that the defendant's
actions were a substantial factor in causing the injuries.6 5 Thus, if it is
merely possible that the defendant caused the event or that it is equally
likely .that he did not, then the court must direct the verdict for the
defendant.60
61 Masters v. New York Cent. R.R., 147 Ohio St. 293, 70 N.E.2d 898, cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 836 (1947); see 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 51 (1941); PROSSER,
TORTS § 41 (3d ed. 1964).
62 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 56 n.19 (1941); PROSSER, TORTS § 41 n.17
(3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), TORTS § 432 (1) (1965).63OS PROSsER, TORTS 5 41 nn.25 & 26 (3d ed. 1964); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND),
TORTS § 431 (1965).64 E.g., Schulingkamp v. Bolton Ford, Inc., 163 So. 2d 161 (La. Ct. App.
1964); Carney v. Bereault, 204 N.E.2d 448 (Mass. 1965); J. J. Newberry Co. v.
Lancaster, 391 P.2d 224 (Okla. 1965).6 E.g., Martin G. Imbach, Inc. v. Tate, 203 Md. 348, 100 A.2d 808 (1953);
Popper v. City of New York, 281 App. Div. 98, 117 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1952);
Woodle v. Brown, 223 S.C. 204, 74 S.E.2d 914 (1953).
o6E.g., Gedra v. Dalrner Co., 153 Ohio St 258, 91 NXE.2d 256 (1950); Burt
v. Lake Region Flying Serv., 78 N.D. 928, 54 N.W.2d 339 (1952); Kane v.
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Since the courts in the vendor-huckster situations do not make any
distinction between causation and proximate cause, the discussion of the
application of the above principles will be presented in the following
section in conjunction with the application of the principles of proximate
cause.
PROXIMATE CAUSE
Having shown that the defendant's actions were one of the causes of
the event, the issue becomes one of ascertaining whether he should be
held liable. This issue is called proximate cause and is an essential element
for the plaintiff to prove.67 The basic rule applied is that there will be
no negligence if it could not be foreseen that any injury would result
from the defendant's conduct, or if his actions were reasonable in view
of those consequences he could foresee.68 The use of this rule, however,
has led to a split in the courts: one view holds the defendant liable for
only those consequences that are foreseeable by a reasonably prudent
person; the other view finds him liable for all the natural and proximate
consequences of his negligent acts.69
Thus the first view uses the test of foreseeability to determine if the
defendant's act was negligent, then applies it again to determine if he will
be held liable. Many of the courts that follow this rule also require that
the event be the "natural and probable consequence of the defendant's
conduct. 70 This means that not only must the event be such as ordinarily
happens upon such conduct, but it must be more likely that it will hap-
pen than not. An additional limitation that has been accepted generally
is that the plaintiff must be within a forseeable class of persons who
might be injured by the defendant's conduct.71
The second view applies the foreseeability test only to determine if
the defendant's conduct was negligent. Once it is decided that he was, he
is liable for all consequences that follow in unbroken sequence without
an intervening, efficient cause.72 The theory behind this rule is that if
one of the parties must suffer, it is better that it be the negligent defend-
ant than the innocent plaintiff.
In vendor-huckster situations, since the plaintiff was actually injured
by another party, the courts have to consider concurring and intervening
causes in determining if the conduct of the defendant was the proximate
67 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 51, at 697 n.7 (1941).68E.g., Knutson v. Iambert, 235 Minn. 328, 51 N.W.2d 580 (1951); Helm
v. South Pa. Oil Co., 382 Pa. 437, 114 A.2d 909 (1955); Puffer v. Hub Cigar
Store, Inc., 140 W. Va. 327, 84 SE.2d 145 (1954).69 P OsSER, ToRTs § 50 (3d ed. 1964).
7038 AM. JUn. Negligence S 57, at 705 n.6 & 8 (1941).
71PRossR, ToRTs S 50, at 294-95 & nn.96-99, 1-9 (3d ed. 1964>.7 2 PRossoR, ToRTs S 50, at 299-301 & nn.41 & 42 (3d ed. 1964>.
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. When the negligence of the defendant
is shown to be the cause of the plaintiff's injuries, liability is not avoided
merely because the negligence of a third party also contributed to the
event. 3 Thus, when the concurrent negligence of two defendants cause
an event, which could not have happened unless both were negligent,
they are each considered to have proximately caused the injury even though
having acted independently.74 However, in order to find the defendant
liable when his conduct must concur with that of another person, the
defendant must foresee, or in exercise of reasonable diligence would have
foreseen, the concurring actions of the other party. 5
The negligence of the defendant will not result in his liability when
the plaintiff's injuries are caused by the intervention of a new, independ-
ent and efficient cause. The new cause must not be foreseeable by the
defendant, a result of his earlier negligence, or controlled by him.6 The
fact that the intervening act is by the infant plaintiff, who, as a matter
of law because of age, cannot be guilty of contributory negligence, does
not affect the case, unless the conduct of the infant was foreseeable.7
When the defendant causes a situation which reasonable efforts by the
plaintiff in attempting to escape are not considered intervening causes
exempting the defendant from liability. 8
The courts that have held the defendant not liable have generally done
so on the basis of either duty79 or proximate cause. In Bloom"s the
Maryland court ruled that the acts of the defendant would not be the
proximate cause of the event if the negligence of the defendant was
merely passive and the negligence of another was the moving and effec-
tive cause of the injury. The court held that even assuming that the
defendant was negligent, any connection between the negligence and
the injury was broken by the intervening causes of the child leaving the
truck, walking behind it into the road, and the sudden appearance of an
oncoming automobile. In Mollieres it was implied that since there was
no evidence the defendant knew of the presence of the plaintiff, the drop-
ping of the crab could not be negligence proximately causing the injury,
the plaintiff not being within the foreseeable class of persons to be harmed.
To this court the cause of the injury was the intervening acts of the child
running into the road and being struck by another vehicle. In Mead s2 the
court in quoting from the district court, said: ". . . (T]he attractive
presence of the vending truck at the time and place of this accident merely
73 38 AM. Jtj. Negligence § 64, at 717 n.18 (1941).
74 38 AM. JtJ. Negligence § 64, at 717 nn.3 & 4 (1941).
7's 38 Am. JUR. Negligence § 66 n.15 (1941).
76 38 AM. Jtnl Negligence § 68, 724 nn.1 & 2 (1941).
77 38 AM. JUR. Negligence § 74 nn.8, 13, 15, § 76 nn.2 & 3 (1941).
7838 A .JutR. Negligence § 77 nn.14 & 20 (1914).
79 See notes 50-55 supra and accompanying text.80 Bloom v. Good Humor Ice Cream Co., supra note 51.
91 Moliere v. American Ins. Group, supra note 36.82 Mead v. Parker, 340 F.2d 157 (6th Cir. 1965).
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created the occasion which afforded opportunity for another event to
produce the minor plaintiff's injuries ..... 83
In those cases where the court has found the vendor liable, a more
liberal attitude toward proximate cause is held. In McKay 8 4 the court
ruled that the negligence of the defendant was the proximate cause of
the event since he should have foreseen the exact accident that happened.
Although an independent act intervened between his negligence and the
injury, the defendant was liable as he should have foreseen the happen-
ing of the intervening act. Whether the violation of the statute in
Landers sr was a concurring proximate cause of the injuries of the plaintiff
was held to be a question for the jury. As the concurring opinion pointed
out, the purpose of the statute was to prevent accidents from streets being
rendered too narrow from vehicles parking too far from the curb. It was
immaterial that the defendant did not foresee that his obstruction of the
street would lead to the plaintiff being injured by one of two racing auto-
mobiles. On the basis of the defendant's negligence in obstructing the
view of approaching motorists, the court in Vought8s held that the de-
fendant, at the very least, concurrently caused the injury to the plaintiff
who was crossing the street from behind the truck. The negligence of
the defendant was considered to have continued until the time of the
injury and was not superseded by the other motorist's possible negligence.
In Mackey 8 7 the defendant was held to have been negligent as a matter
of law in attracting children to a hazardous place, failing to keep a look-
out for approaching traffic, and not warning the children of this traffic.
Regardless of whether the approaching driver was negligent, the defend-
.ant should have foreseen that one of his customers would be hit while
running from behind the parked truck. Thus, the defendant proximately
caused the injuries to the plaintiff.
In light of Vought where the defendant was parked at the side of the
road, the court in Bloom where the defendant was parked near the center
of the road appears to have adopted an unrealistic attitude toward proxi-
mate cause. It is hard to understand why such an obstruction of the view
of oncoming motorists is held to be a remote cause, especially when the
court considers the plaintiff's walking from behind the truck and the
sudden appearance of the motorist as intervening causes. Rather than
ruling as a matter of law, as the court did in Molliere that the actions
of the plaintiff were intervening causes, it seems that the argument by
the dissent 8 8 should have been sufficient to remand the case for the
jury to consider.
83 Id. at 159-60.
84 McKay v. Hedger, 139 Cal. App. 266, 34 P.2d 221 (1934).85Landers v. French's Ice Cream Co., 98 Ga. App. 317, 106 S.E.2d 324
(1958).
8 6 Vought v. Jones, 205 Va. 719, 139 S.E.2d 810 (1965).8 7 Mackey v. Spradlin, sura note 41.8 8 See note 54 supra and accompanying text.
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